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INTERGOVERNMENTAL FISCAL RELATIONS IN RUSSIA

Roy Bahl, Jorge Martinez-Vazquez and Sally Wallace*
Policy Research Center
College of Business Administration
Georgia State University

Introduction

To say that Russia's system of intergovernmental fiscal relations is unstable is a gross understatement. In 1992
budgets were adopted in each quarter, the structures of the major taxes were changed twice, and the rules for rev

sharing between the central government and oblasts were changed several times. Because budgets and reven

sharing rules were being finalized at the beginning of each quarter in 1992, there was little opportunity for effec

fiscal planning by subnational governments, and local officials had concerns that revenue sharing rules
expenditure assignments were being made on an ad hoc basis.

In the long run, the structure of intergovernmental fiscal relations will almost certainly include some form o
tax assignment, probably supported by an equalizing grant program administered through the central governm

Russia is too large in population and area and too ethnically and economically diverse to succeed as a hig

centralized fiscal federation. In the short time since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, changes in fiscal federalis
have been driven primarily by macroeconomic concerns as the central government offloaded expenditure resp
bilities on to lower level governments in order to lighten its deficit, and then made piecemeal adjustments in the t
sharing formulae to placate the now overburdened subnational governments.1

The present situation of intergovernmental fiscal relations is not sustainable, and widespread dissatisfaction w
force major changes in the near future. But no consensus has emerged around any particular plan. In this paper
describe the present system in terms of expenditure assignment and financing methods and responsibilities, and t
turn to a discussion of the major issues that have been raised by this system. The paper concludes with some b
observations about future options.

The Present System

It is probably not accurate to describe intergovernmental fiscal relations in Russia as a "system." A syste
imply the following: a correspondence between revenue and expenditure assignments; a transparency in the a
rules made by the central government; some stated goals for local fiscal autonomy; a fiscal plan beyond one y
a clearly defined approach to equalization of fiscal disparities among provinces. The Russian system is non
things: expenditure and revenue assignment decisions are made quite independent of one another; for the ver
run the allocation of resources among oblasts is more ad hoc and negotiated than it is formula driven; and su
governments have precious little fiscal autonomy. The present arrangements have resulted as much from stab
pressures and privatization problems as from design.

Expenditure Assignment

The division of expenditure responsibilities among levels of government appears to more or less m
pattern one would expect if the traditional efficiency rules for expenditure arrangements were followed
Those items with larger externalities and economies of scale appear to be assigned to the central governm
those items with regional significance to the oblast level, and the local public goods to the municipal and ray
However, this is misleading, because the subnational governments do not have complete autonomy to fix
composition or level of those services. Amajority of substantive budget decisions are made by the central gov
especially those related to the size and composition of the budget. Little consideration is given to the pref

*This paper draws on our earlier work, Bahl and Wallace (1993), Martinez- Vasquez (1993), Coop
Lybrand (1993). See also World Bank (1992).
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local residents. While some gains in efficiency could come through lower costs of service
have been any such gains. Since subnational governments have little discretion over any b

make, they have little incentive to operate efficiently. Under the old regime, such savings

by the central government at the end of the fiscal year. Under the present system, the tax

to claim any surplus, or the subvention might be reduced.
Two recent changes have taken place which affect the efficiency of expenditure assig
legislation was approved by the Supreme Soviet in 1992: the Law on the Rights of Loc
Law on Budgetary Rights. This legislation has given local governments the power to
revenues without fear that surpluses will be extracted by the central government. B
governments could raise revenues according to the powers given them under the law, but
(own and shared) exceeded the Ministry's estimates of their budgetary needs. The sur
the Ministry via a transfer of their cash balance within the banking system. Under the ne

possible. This new legislation shows the beginnings of a responsive, accountable an

government. However, it remains possible for the Ministry of Finance to adjust the tax sh

emerges for the current period, or to adjust the sharing rates or the subvention in the nex

surplus obtained in the previous period.
Second, recent reassignment of some important spending responsibilities of the ce
and rayon governments has clearly violated the principle of efficiency. These responsibili
service expenditures, which give subnational governments more responsibility for inc
capital expenditures. These changes were the result of short-sighted decisions made by
not part of a long-term plan of intergovernmental division of expenditure responsi

changes include projects with substantial spillover effects which are clearly the r

government, such as housing for the military. Pressure on subnational budgets has al
expenditure implications of central government assets that have been transferred dow
from the assumption of responsibilities for public services from state enterprises, which
the former regime, state enterprises provided many types of public services to their
education, housing and infrastructure.

Revenue Assignment

Most subnational government revenues are derived from four shared taxes whose rate
central government. All taxes are shared on a derivation basis (i.e., by point of collecti
every budget period by the government and the Parliament. The determination of the shar
form part, together with small locally raised revenues and central government subvention
"minimum required budget" for oblasts. This minimum required budget, which in the pas
of detailed and comprehensive "norms" and nowadays is more a reflection of past expendi
is largely a negotiated outcome. This process of budget determination takes away any last
revenue sharing schemes. The minimum required budget gets funded one way or another
so that enough revenues, but not more than needed, are raised to finance the required
The current basic system of revenue sharing is summarized in Table 2. The individual i
by local governments (rayons) on a basis of place of employment. Coverage of the self
limited, and revenue yield is sensitive to high rates of inflation and to changes in the tax
levels, and wage levels (which inflation has forced the central government to make on
collected by the enterprises on a withholding basis.
The enterprise income tax is levied at a 32 percent rate on company profits. Oblast lev

an amount equivalent to that derived from a 22 percent tax, and must turn the remainder o

Oblasts may not increase the tax rate but may lower their rate to 20 percent. Revenue
government's decisions about input and output prices, capital allocations (past and pres

tax base.

The value added tax is shared among subnational governments on a derivation basis, but the percent of
collections that may be retained varies by oblast. These retention rates have been established to "regulate" the revenues
necessary to finance the minimum required budgets and have been changed frequently in the past year. In 1993, most

oblasts will retain half of VAT collections. (See column 4 of Table 3.)
The sharing rates for the enterprise income tax and the VAT have changed significantly during 1992 and early
1993. The direction of change appears to have favored subnational governments, though it is not clear whether the
increased claim on local revenues has been adequate to offset the increased expenditure responsibilities assigned
(Martinez- Vazquez, TRED, 1993). The retention rate on the enterprise income tax has increased from 15 to 22 points
(on the 32 percent rate) since early 1992. The increase in the value added tax sharing rate is more difficult to estimate
because the sharing rate varies by oblast. However, the median VAT retention rate has doubled in the past year.
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The entire tax system is administered by the state ta
Formally, subnational governments have no responsibili

reporting hierarchy for the oblast, rayon, and district offi

there may be an issue of dual subordination with the

responsibility for tax administration. Most local STS officer
assumption of responsibility for tax administration, and loc

even fringe benefits (including housing) for STS employ
Actual data for 1992 and budget estimates for 1993 sho
thirds of their revenues from four taxes: excises, individ
to autonomous regions and subventions amounted to less
1992. This is a lower figure than many would expect. The
a number of smaller subnational taxes. Budget estimates
As noted above, the average rate of sharing varies, by
governments retained about 48 percent of tax collection

factored in, the subnational share of total revenues is closer
retention rate for the three largest taxes for 1993, mostly

Equalization Patterns
There are wide variations in the level of economic development among Russia's 91 oblasts (and okrugs, Krais
and autonomous republics), and one might expect, therefore, wide variations in fiscal capacity and spending levels.
This suspicion is confirmed by the evidence.

Revenues

Per capita revenues raised in each oblast averaged R 1 5 thousand in 1 992. However, the variation among oblasts
was extremely large with a maximum of R 88 thousand. The retention rate averaged about 50 percent for the 89 oblasts
in 19923. This varied from a low of 38 percent to a high of 100 percent.

Is there some rough justice in the present system of revenue sharing, i.e., are revenues implicitly distributed
among the oblasts in some systematic way? To try and answer this question, a multiple regression analysis was carried

out on actual 1992 data for 88 oblasts with per capita retained revenues (excluding subventions) as the dependent

variable.4

Four results stand out from the results of this analysis. First, about half of the variation in per capita retained
revenues can be explained. One could look at this as suggesting that there are other important determinants of per
capita revenues accruing to oblasts including outright bargaining by oblasts with central government authorities, or
that the allocation process is random. Another view is that it is surprising that so much of the variation can be
explained, given the transition and the present disarray of the Russian economy and fiscal administration. The second
result is that oblasts with a larger population, and with a heavier concentration of population in rural areas, cet. par.,
retain more revenue on a per capita basis. The third is that oblasts with a higher average wage, and with a higher growth

rate in the average wage, retain significantly more on a per capita basis. Fourth, there does not appear to be a strong
association between these "needs" indicators and per capita retained revenues. None of the needs variables - hospital
beds, infant mortality rates, or highway density - turned out to be significant determinants.
Taken together, these results suggest that in 1992, revenue distributions were driven in significant part by the
strength of the economic base (wage levels, wage growth, and population size). This funding is consistent with the
results of a similar analysis carried out by The World Bank on data for the first half of 1992.5
Equalization in fiscal capacity can come from the distribution of central government grants (subventions) if they

are large enough in amount and distributed heavily toward lower income places. In fact, the median level of
subvention among the 88 oblasts studied here was about 25 percent of total revenues and ranged from a low of zero
to a high of over 90 percent. Were the subventions distributed on an equalizing basis? To test for such a relationship,

we have estimated the relationship between the per capita level of subventions for 1992 and the same set of
independent variables as described above . The regression results reported in B ahi- Wallace ( 1 993 ) show that per capita
subventions are significantly higher in oblasts with a greater fiscal capacity, suggesting a counterequalizing pattern.
These results tend to confirm the importance of political bargaining in the relations between the central government
and the regional governments. Finally, per capita subventions tend to be significantly higher in oblasts with smaller

and more urbanized populations. About 40 percent of the variation among the 88 oblasts studied here could be
explained, suggesting that the actual distribution is driven to an important extent by other factors, including political

bargaining. There is no evidence that per capita subventions are allocated in greater amounts to oblasts where
expenditure needs are greater.
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In sum, there is no strong evidence that the 1992 revenue sharing system is equalizing, even

is taken into account. In fact, the distribution patterns of shared taxes and subventions are simi

Expenditures

Not surprisingly, there are also wide expenditure disparities across oblasts. For the first
which complete data were available), expenditures per capita ranged from R 1,992 to R 16,

of R 3,587 and a coefficient of variation of 0.63. This suggests significant disparities among obla
face value, a noticeable increase in the degree of variation in per capita total expenditures among

For example, in 1991, per capita expenditures among oblasts ranged from R 139 to R 4,253

R 1 ,243 and a coefficient of variation of 0.54. Several other ways of testing the relationship betw

and per capita oblast income lead to the same conclusion. For example, regressing per capita e
monthly wages and other independent variables shows that expenditures are positively and s
average incomes. These regressions also show that per capita expenditures are negatively re
urbanization and the number of rayons within the oblast. Better off regions receive higher
allocations, while the urban areas are relatively "under served" in expenditures.6
Clearly, it is too early to draw definite conclusions about equity in the new regime. But the
evidence shows that per capita expenditures were not equalizing, even in the first quarter of 199
when the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation agreed to keep a "bargained" tax-sharin

precisely to avoid major inequalities in the distribution of resources . The potential for inequalitie

the system moves more toward derivation-based, fixed sharing rates for all major taxes as it did

Issues and Problems

If the Russian government is to have a sustainable intergovernmental fiscal system, it must address the followin
challenges to the present system.

1. There is a need to devise a stable, efficient and fair assignment of expenditure responsibilities. By

concentrating exclusively on the question of revenue assignment, the government has been putting "the cart before

the horse." The major challenges ahead in the assignment of expenditure responsibilities involve some degree
devolution to the central government of social expenditures, safety net responsibilities, and capital spend

responsibilities. This exercise also needs to internalize the budgeting implications of the transfers in asset ownership

in particular housing maintenance, from the central to subnational governments and those brought up by th
divestiture of public services and functions by state enterprises.

2. There is a need to address the correspondence between the level of revenues allocated to subnation
governments and the revenues needed to deliver an adequate level of services for those functions that have b
assigned to subnational governments. Governments everywhere always have a revenue shortage in that they a
never able to deliver all the services they would like. The problem with the intergovernmental financing system

Russia is not this chronic government revenue problem, but rather that the balance of revenue sources between the
central government level and the subnational government level is not right. This is an unsettled issue. As the loc
see it, the center has offloaded expenditure responsibility onto them, but has not given up a corresponding revenue
share. The central government will point out that the local share of revenues has been increasing and now is well ov
50 percent.

3. The present system is not transparent, and therefore the subnational governments do not have
confidence in it. To a large extent, the entire budget outcome, including revenue sharing, is determined in the
formulation of the "minimum required budgets," which itself involves a great deal of negotiation and bargaining. A

transparent system of intergovernmental finance is one where all levels of government understand the rules of
expenditure assignment and revenue sharing and therefore understand their entitlements under the system. As
important, they understand how those rules were made. The Russian system is not transparent in that the rationale
for the underlying rules for tax sharing is not clear, e.g., how are the VAT retention rates determined for each oblast,
and what is the implicit formula for the distributing of subventions? Perhaps most troublesome of all, expenditure
assignments remain murky. The central government has long been able to manipulate the amount of revenues accruing
to the subnational governments, using three instruments: the amount of subventions, the variable VAT sharing rate

and the approval process for subnational budgets.

4. The present system does not give local governments any significant measure of fiscal autonomy.
Economic efficiency gains are the result of granting local governments increased autonomy in their taxing and
spending decisions. The present system of taxation gives Russian subnational governments little autonomy on the
revenue side. All tax rates and bases are decided by the central government. Tax administration is a central government
function, and the borrowing rights of local governments are strictly circumscribed. Discretion on the expenditure side
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is also limited by the central government. One way this is e

subnational governments' ability to control expenditure
resources, a "balanced budget act" that includes central d
and rayon governments, central wage policies, and the
appointment of local finance officials.

5. The present system does not make adequate prov
derivation basis, which is inherently counterequalizing,

inversely related to income level of the oblast. Subventions
but do not appear to be adequate enough in size to offset t
sharing system. The resulting pattern of per capita expe

6. The objectives of the central government's reven
revenue sharing system if the central and oblast gover
governments are free to share revenues with their const

defines its own formula for sharing its taxes and each dec
to local governments.

7. The present system is so unstable that subnational
Budgets were made up on a quarter-by-quarter basis in 1
oftentimes the changes were made after the quarter ha

reassignment of expenditure responsibility, two major tax r

governments could do little by way of planning their fi

8. The central government does not have adequate
policy. Over half of all revenues from the major taxes are

ability of the central government to use resources for

government to control the aggregate government deficit s
would be a politically charged issue. In addition, many subn
sharing rules, disabling any overt stabilization policy.

9. The centralized approach to tax administration has

system. There are many examples of local governments' m

for revenue sharing, and some oblasts are reported to be wi
sector. That there are tax administration problems during

tax structure and the system of tax sharing new, but the
It was formed in 1990, mostly with former employees of
flaws in the system of tax administration have been magn
flaws include uncertainty about the tax laws, an inadequate
administration procedures.

Conclusion

The Russian system of federalism is in the midst of a difficult transition. The country was left with a sys
which subnational governments simply implemented plans developed in Moscow. Now, in the wake of hyperinfla

and political instability, the central government is offloading expenditure responsibilities to the subn

governments without expanding the revenue raising authority in a complementary manner.
The present system of revenue sharing is based on shared taxes and subventions. Currently, about half
revenue collected is retained by subnational governments. Enterprise and individual income, excise and valu
tax revenue constitute the largest share of all revenue collected. The distribution of revenues retained and t
of per capita subventions are driven by economic base such that neither revenue source is equalizing. Our w
one oblast, Chelyabinsk, suggests that oblast revenue sharing policy may be more equalizing than central govern
revenue sharing policy.
The central government has repeatedly shifted additional expenditure responsibilities to oblast and r
governments. While the Soviet distribution of expenditure responsibilities was closer to the textbook the

assignment, these recent changes offload what should be central government responsibilities to subn
governments. The transfer of responsibilities has been done in an ad hoc fashion primarily to avoid an in

budget crisis at the central level. The arbitrariness in the reassignment of responsibilities to subnational govern
has actually put the Russian Federation on a dangerous political path. The integrity of the Federation itself is at
as the central government offloads obligations which, to a large extent, are the only justification for its existen
the eyes of skeptical subnational governments - some of which have already declared independence from M
The Russian Federation urgently needs to stabilize the budget process, assignment of expenditure respon
ties, and assignment of tax responsibilities. In this paper, we have summarized the current situation in expe
and revenue responsibilities which paints a picture of increased fiscal pressure on subnational governments with
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equalization by the central government. The future of the Federation no doubt stands on t

Endnotes

1. In 1992, the consolidated subnational budget showed a small surplus in contrast to a large deficit for the
federal budget. This has been frequently interpreted as a sign that subnational governments are not overburden
However, subnational governments are required to operate with balanced budgets and this is typically respected.
use the term "overburdened" to mean that subnational governments have been asked to take over more responsibiliti
for services, while funding in real terms has decreased dramatically.
2. This average is computed as total revenues retained by all oblasts divided by total revenues collected.
3. This is calculated as the average of the retention rates of the 89 oblasts.
4. More detailed information regarding this portion of the analysis is available in Bahl and Wallace (1993)

5. World Bank (1992)
6. See Martinez- Vazquez (1993).
7. A comprehensive evaluation of tax administration in Russia was carried out by the IMF in early 1992.
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TABLE 1

Expenditure Assignment in the Russian Federation
Defense
100 100
percent
except:
Militar)'
housing
"
f Expenditure
Defense
percent Central
except: - -Militar)'
housing Oblasts
- Rayons-" Village
Soviets
Justice/Internal Security 100 percent - - "
Foreign

Economics

100

percent

-

-

"

Relations

Education(l) - All university and research

institute expenditures Several special vocational Wages, operation
schools construction, and

-All technical and vocational maintenance of all primary

schools expenditures and secondary schools
Culture and Parks'2^ National museums Some museums with oblast Some museums
significance

National theater All recurrent expenditures of
all sport and park facilities
and all other cultural
facilities

IIealth<3) Medical research institutes Tertiary hospitals, Secondary hospitals Paramedics
psychiatric hospitals, veteran

hospitals, diagnostic centers. Primary health clinics
and special

service hospitals Medicines
(cardiology, etc.)

Roads'41 Construction of all roads
Maintenance of federal roads Maintenance of oblast roads Maintenance of rayon and Maintenance of

city roads commercial roads
Public Transportation (Previously interjurisdictional Most public transportation Some transportation facilities

highways, air, rail) facilities (earlier assigned to including subway systems
central government)

Fire Protection - Voluntary, military and

Most fire protection services enterprise service
at this level

Libraries Special libraries, e.g., Lenin Special library services Most local library services
library

Police Services National militia Road (traffic) police Local security police (since |
1
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TABLE 1 (continued)
Expenditure Assignment in the Russian Federation

Defense 1 00 percent except: - Military housing

Sanitation'6* - - Part of garbage collection Part of garbage collection
(garbage collection)

Se'vage<7) Infrastructure capital Most of the operational Some operational
investment expenditures expenditures

I (garbage ExpePublic
nditure Se'vage<7) Sanitation'6* Defense PublicUtilities
Utilities col ection) (gas, - Infrastructure - investment 1 0 perce(gas,
nt Central capital except: - - - Military Oblasts hou-sing expendiSubsidies
tures Most Part Subsidies of of garbage the Rayons to operational houto
seholds col ection expehouseholds
nditures Some Part of Vil age operational garbage Soviets col ection

|

electricity, and water) (not enterprises) |

Housing(8) Building and development Maintenance and small
scale building

Price Subsidies - - Fuels, Mass transport, ļ
medicines

Welfare Compensation Part central government Part oblast government Managing programs
responsibility responsibility' funded by upper level

I Welfare Compensation Part responsibility central government Part responsibility' oblast government medicines funded Food: governments Managing bread, by upper programs milk, level |
governments

Public Enterprises Capacity to invest in joint Capacity to invest in joint

(productive sectors) ventures (keeps 50 percent ventures (keeps 50 percent |

of privatization proceeds if of privatization proceeds if |

rayon subordination) rayon subordination and
1 0 percent of any other

subordination)

environmental is ues environmental problems,
e.g., preservation of forests

Enterprises "Group A" enterprises, "Group C" enterprises, If transferred to local level
e.g., transport and heavy e.g., local light industry,

I Environment Enterprises environmental Responsible e.g., "Group industry transport A" enterprises, for andindustry
is ues national heavy Responsible environmenthousing
al e.g., e.g., "Group housing preservation loconstruction
cal C" construction light enterprises, for problems, industry, locaand
l of
food industry

"Group B" enterprises,

e.g..

light

industry,

|

transport and agriculture |
(
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)

1 ) Public enterprises also build schools but typically do not operate them They fre
Some enterprises build sport facilities.
Some enterprises build hospitals and in some cases also operate them Social insurance mostly financed by enterprises pays for health services of those covered.
There is a "Special Extrabudgetary Fund" financed by an excise tax on oil consumption.
There are special fire protection services provided by enterprises, but on the decrease
Usually there are no separate user charges for garbage collection
There are separate user charges for sewage
Enterprises have been important builders of housing and own close to half of the housing stock in Russia. The central government has transferred housing to local
governments; maintenance is the responsibility of the level of government or enterprises owning them Capital expenditures are included unless otherwise noted.
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TABLE 2

REVENUE SHARING IN RUSSIA

Amount Allocated Method of

Revenue Source to Subnational Distribution Among Comments
Governments Oblasts

Individual Income Tax 100 percent Derivation, by place of Fully allocated to the
employment rayon level
Company Income Tax Tax rate is 32 percent; 22 Derivation Oblast may reduce rate by
percent rate belongs to the 2 percent
oblast

Value Added Tax 20 to 50 percent of Derivation, with an ad
collections, depending on hoc determination of the

the oblast percent for each oblast
Excise on Vodka 50 percent of collections Derivation

Other Excises 100 percent of collections Derivation Excise on motor vehicles
to Center

Subventions and Transfers Ad hoc determination Ad hoc determination Distribution largely base
to Autonomous Regions on "Approved" Deficits,
and Special Projects

TABLE 3

REVENUE STRUCTURE AND REVENUE SHARING

(in billions of rubles)

1992

I

Percent Retained Exhibit: Budgeted
Total Subnational by Subnational Average Retention

Tax/Revenue Collections Amount Governments Rate for 1993
Individual

Income

431.3

431.3

100.0

100.0

Tax

Enterprise Income 1,566.8 920.9 58.8 66.7
Tax

VAT

1,998.9

Excises

Foreign

211.5

Trade

498.7
110.8

467.4

24.9
52.3

8.0

30.4
61.5

1.7

NA

Taxes

All

Other

Taxes

1,566.1

374.3

23.9

NA

Total Revenue 5,313.7 2,529.5 47.6 43.4a
Excises, Income, 4,205.5 1,960.9 46.6 63.2
Value-Added

Source: Data supplies by Ministry of Finance
a This total refers only to excises and the income and value added taxes.
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